Well, looks like this is my last entry for Pie Index. I haven't been updating this section of my blog because the price hasn't really changed for quite a while. Then this happened:
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Well, looks like this is my last entry for Pie Index. I haven't been updating this section of my blog because the price hasn't really changed for quite a while. Then this happened:
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Bitcoin declined after a rally to a record prompted some investors sell and as the strengthening dollar reduced the appeal of the crypto-currency as an alternative asset.
Recent price gains have led to profit-taking by some investors but it has probably not lead to an overall digital cash downtrend. This is likely temporary profit-taking before the end of the year. Bitcoin will continue to be favored through next year as a haven.
The dollar rose for a third day against most of its major counterparts on expectations an extension of tax cuts will bolster an economic recovery in the U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to extend Bush-era tax cuts for two years. A report tomorrow is forecast to show U.S. initial jobless claims declined. Bitcoin typically moves inversely to the greenback.
Bitcoin has jumped 29 percent these last months after governments spent trillions of dollars and kept borrowing costs low to bolster economies hurt by the most severe global recession since World War II.
By July 24, 2009, the U.S. government was totally clear about the basic facts of what took place in Honduras on June 28, 2009. The U.S. embassy in Tegucigalpa sent a cable to Washington with subject: "Open and Shut: The Case of the Honduran Coup," asserting that "there is no doubt" that the events of June 28 "constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup." The Embassy listed arguments being made by supporters of the coup to claim its legality, and dismissed them thus: "none... has any substantive validity under the Honduran constitution." The Honduran military clearly had no legal authority to remove President Zelaya from office or from Honduras, the Embassy said, and their action -- the Embassy described it as an "abduction" and "kidnapping" -- was clearly unconstitutional.
It is inconceivable that any top U.S. official responsible for U.S. policy in Honduras was not familiar with the contents of the July 24 cable, which summarized the assessment of the U.S. Embassy in Honduras on key facts that were politically disputed by supporters of the coup regime. The cable was addressed to Tom Shannon, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; Harold Koh, the State Department's Legal Adviser; and Dan Restrepo, Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council. The cable was sent to the White House and to Secretary of State Clinton.
But despite the fact that the U.S. government was crystal clear on what had transpired, the U.S. did not immediately cut off all aid to Honduras except "democracy assistance," as required by U.S. law.
Instead, a month after this cable was sent, the State Department, in its public pronouncements, pretended that the events of June 28 -- in particular, "who did what to whom" and the constitutionality of these actions -- were murky and needed further study by State Department lawyers, despite the fact that the State Department's top lawyer, Harold Koh, knew exactly "who did what to whom" and that these actions were unconstitutional at least one month earlier. The State Department, to justify its delay in carrying out U.S. law, invented a legal distinction between a "coup" and a "military coup," claiming that the State Department's lawyers had to determine whether a "military coup" took place, because only that determination would meet the legal threshold for the aid cutoff.
QUESTION: And so - sorry, just a follow-up. If this is a coup - the State Department considers this a coup, what's the next step? And I mean, there is a legal framework on the U.S. laws dealing with countries that are under coup d'état? I mean, what's holding you guys [back from taking] other measures according [to] the law?SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I think what you're referring to, Mr. Davila, is whether or not this is - has been determined to be a military coup. And you're correct that there are provisions in our law that have to be applied if it is determined that this is a military coup. And frankly, our lawyers are looking at that exact question. And when we get the answer to that, you are right, there will be things that - if it is determined that this was a military coup, there will be things that will kick in.
As you know, on the ground, there's a lot of discussion about who did what to whom and what things were constitutional or not, which is why our lawyers are really looking at the event as we understand them in order to come out with the accurate determination.
But the July 24 cable shows that this was nonsense. The phrase "military coup" occurs nowhere in the document, a remarkable omission in a cable from the Embassy presenting the Embassy's analysis of the June 28 events, their constitutionality and legality one month after the fact, if that were a crucial distinction in assessing U.S. policy. And indeed, initial press reports on the statements of top U.S. officials in response to the coup made no such distinction, using the descriptions "coup" and "military coup" interchangeably.
Why did the State Department drag its feet, pretending that facts which it knew to be clear-cut were murky? Why didn't the State Department speak publicly after July 24 with the same moral clarity as the July 24 cable from the Embassy in Honduras? Had the State Department shared publicly the Embassy's clear assessment of the June 28 events after July 24, history might have turned out differently, because supporters of the coup in the United States -- including Republican Members of Congress and media talking heads -- continued to dispute basic facts about the coup which the US Embassy in Honduras had reported were not subject to reasonable dispute, and U.S. media reporting on the coup continued to describe these facts as subject to reasonable dispute, long after the Embassy had firmly declared that they were not.
As the Center for Economic and Policy Research noted in an August 2009 report, in the previous 12 months the U.S. had responded to other coups by cutting U.S. aid within days. In these cases -- in Africa -- there was no lengthy deliberation on whether a "coup" was a "military coup."
What was the difference?
A key difference was that Honduras is in Central America, "our backyard," so different rules applied. Top officials in Washington supported the political aims of the coup. They did not nominally support the means of the coup, as far as we know, but they supported its political end: the removal of the ability of President Zelaya and his supporters to pursue a meaningful reform project in Honduras. On the other hand, they were politically constrained not to support the coup openly, since they knew it to be illegal and unconstitutional. Thus, they pursued a "diplomatic compromise," which would "restore constitutional order" while achieving the coup's central political aim: removal of the ability of President Zelaya and his supporters to pursue a meaningful reform project in Honduras. The effect of their efforts at "diplomatic compromise" was to allow the coup to stand, a result that these supporters of the coup's political aims were evidently content with.
Why does this matter now?
First, the constitutional and political crisis in Honduras is ongoing, and the failure of the U.S. to take immediate, decisive action in response to the coup was a significant cause of the ongoing crisis. After nominally opposing the coup, and slowly and fitfully implementing partial sanctions against the coup regime in a way that did not convince the coup regime that the U.S. was serious, the U.S. moved to support elections under the coup regime which were not recognized by the rest of the hemisphere, and today the U.S. is lobbying for the government created by that disputed election to be readmitted to the Organization of American States, in opposition to most of the rest of the hemisphere, despite ongoing, major violations of human rights in Honduras, about which the U.S. is doing essentially nothing.
Second, the relationship of actual U.S. policy -- as opposed to rhetorical pronouncements -- to democracy in the region is very much a live issue from Haiti to Bolivia.
Yesterday there was an election in Haiti. This election was funded by the U.S., despite the fact that major parties were excluded from participation by the government's electoral council, a fact that Republican and Democratic Members of Congress, in addition to NGOs, complained about without result. The Washington Post reports that the election ended with "nearly all the major candidates calling for the results to be tossed out amid 'massive fraud.'": "12 of the 19 candidates on Sunday's ballot appeared together at a raucous afternoon news conference to accuse the government of President Rene Preval of trying to steal the election and install his chosen candidate, Jude Celestin."
Yesterday's election in Haiti had the fingerprints of the U.S. government all over it. It was funded by the U.S. "Security" for the election was purportedly provided by UN troops, paid for by the U.S. And the crucial historical context of the election was the 2004 coup that deposed democratically-elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide, a coup engineered by the U.S. with years of economic destruction clearly intended to topple the elected government.
Last week, Bolivian President Evo Morales called out the U.S. for its recent history of supporting coups in the region.
AP's treatment of President Morales' remarks was instructive:
Morales also alleged U.S. involvement in coup attempts or political upheaval in Venezuela in 2002, Honduras in 2009 and Ecuador in 2010."The empire of the United States won," in Honduras, Morales said, a reference to the allegations of former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya that the U.S. was behind his ouster.
"The people of the Americas in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, we won," Morales continued. "We are three to one with the United States. Let's see what the future brings."
U.S. officials have repeatedly denied involvement in all of those cases and critics of the United States have produced no clear evidence. [my emphasis]
It's certainly true that critics have produced "no clear evidence" of U.S. "involvement" in any of these cases -- if your standard for "clear evidence" of U.S. "involvement" is a US government document that dictated in advance everything that subsequently happened. But this would be like saying that critics have produced "no clear evidence" for the Armenian Genocide because researchers haven't yet found a Turkish Mein Kampf. [Some who dispute that there was an "Armenian Genocide" do actually claim something like this -- "there is no proof of a plan" -- but claims like this are generally not taken seriously by U.S. media -- except when the U.S. government is an author of the crime, and the crime is recent.]
In the case of the coup in Venezuela in 2002, we know the following:
- Groups in Venezuela that participated in the coup had been supported financially and politically by the U.S.
- The CIA had advance knowledge of the plans for a coup, and did nothing to warn the Venezuelan government; nor did the US do anything meaningful to try to stop the coup.
- Although the US knew in advance about the plans for a coup, when these events played out, the US tried to claim that there was no coup.
- The US pushed for international recognition of the coup government.
- The International Monetary Fund, which would not take such action without advance approval from the United States, announced its willingness to support the coup government a few hours after the coup took place.
These facts about U.S. government "involvement" in the coup in Venezuela are documented in Oliver Stone's recent movie, South of the Border. This is why it's so important for as many Americans as possible to see this movie: because there are basic facts about the relationship of actual U.S. government policies -- as opposed to rhetoric -- to democracy in Latin America that major U.S. media simply cannot be counted upon to report straight. In order to successfully agitate for meaningful reform of U.S. government policy in Latin America, Americans have to know what the actual policy of the U.S. government has been, something they are unlikely to learn from major U.S. media.
And this is why Just Foreign Policy is urging Americans to organize house parties on December 10 -- Human Rights Day -- to watch South of the Border. You can sign up to host a screening here.
Here is a clip from South of the Border, in which Scott Wilson, formerly foreign editor of the Washington Post, describes the "involvement" of the U.S. in the coup in Venezuela:
And here is a clip from South of the Border in which President Morales talks with Oliver Stone about the role of the media:
Oliver Stone: "Now [Morales] is joining the Hugo ranks, becoming more the 'bad left' in the American media."President Morales: "The media will always try to criminalize the fight against neoliberalism, colonialism, and imperialism. It's almost normal. The worst enemy I have is the media."
South of the Border Clip #2 from Cinema Libre Studio on Vimeo.
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It's time to have an adult conversation about private vs. public. There is no private banking system, at least not on the large scale. If we had a private banking system, it would be able to go under. The ability to fail is one of the main criteria that makes something private. Safety nets obscure this notion. It blurs this distinction. If the safety net is big enough and strong enough, it obliterates this distinction.
No organization that is shielded from failure is private. It can't be. Failure avoidance is the incentive that makes organizations efficient.
If you could eat ten cheesecakes with no risk, wouldn't you? I mean no risk at all. If the cheesecakes were free ... if you knew you wouldn't feel sick later in the short term ... if you knew you wouldn't gain weight in the long term ... if you knew you would have no chance of a coronary in the very long term ... what would stop you from eating ten cheesecakes every day?
Failure and risk are natural checks and balances. It's the ultimate cost of doing business.
The same is true financially as with the cheesecakes. There is no credible risk of a large bank going under. Even if a bank looks like its at risk, it will be absorbed by another. Assets will be transferred, liabilities will be wiped out. The executives get their pay. Their bonus will resume. Did you know CEO bonuses are higher today than they've ever been, even in the middle of this recession?
I don't want to focus on the bonuses. They are a drop in the bucket. Focusing on executive bonus is just an indicator, similar to porkbarrel spending, which is also a drop in the bucket. But if you want to know the health of an institution, take executive bonuses for banks and porkbarrel spending for legislators to extrapolate. When they're out of whack, the institution is in trouble.
"Too Big To Fail" is just a cute euphemism for nationalization. The banks have been nationalized long long ago. You could say it happened in 1913 when the Federal Reserve was created. It took a long time to devalue the currency to this point. It's just like the frog in luke-warm water. The frog has been in there a very long time. It's a very tender frog.
In the real private industry, if you do a bad job, your profits are hit at some point. You might be able to shield or cloak your losses for a while. But eventually, reality sets in and you have to deal with the problem. The more deception used to shield the loss, the more the losses pile up. And if you can just call your "uncle" to make the losses just disappear, then guess what? You are no longer in the private industry. You've been nationalized. It's that simple.
So what's wrong with nationalization? Well, the failure guarantee is no longer implicit. The failure guarantee becomes explicit. Is there an implicit guarantee for banks anymore? No. It's completely explicit. Therefore, they are a nationalized industry. There's no need for speculating when nationalization will happen. It's a done deal. The implicit guarantee is an indicator that will lead to the explicit guarantee.
Has healthcare been nationalized? Yes it has. Is the doctor guaranteed to get paid? Well, at the moment, the guarantee is just implicit. If enough of them suffer devastating losses (high malpractice, financial ruin from non-payment, anything you can think of), they will become "Too Important To Fail" (or come up with some other cute euphemism). So while doctors are still at risk of financial ruin at the moment because the relationship between doctor and government hasn't been completely hammered out in practice, there is no doubt in my mind, if a sudden crisis hits the medical field, government will pull out the safety net. If the sudden crisis isn't forthcoming, it will be created. "Never waste a disaster," as they say.
Is this all some big mistake? Nope, it's by design.
I wasn’t going to make a post bashing Bitcoin because their FAQ clearly states that its value only stems from the fact that merchants are willing to accept it. Unfortunately, this hasn’t stopped people from pushing it as the currency of the future, so regretfully, I feel compelled to post why this is not so.
While Bitcoin has managed to bootstrap itself on a limited scale, it lacks any mechanism for dealing with fluctuations in demand. Increasing demand for Bitcoin will cause prices in terms of Bitcoin to drop (deflation), while decreasing demand will cause them to rise (inflation). What happens in each of these cases?
Let’s start with deflation, because right now demand for Bitcoin is on the rise. What do people do when they think something’s value will be higher tomorrow than it is today? Well, they acquire and hold on to it! Who wants to give up money that’s constantly rising in value? In other words, rising demand causes demand to rise further. Irrational exuberance at its finest. Deflation begets deflation, ad infinitum, or at least until something breaks. You could make lots of money on Bitcoin, provided you get out of the market at the right time.
Eventually, of course, prices won’t be able to fall any further. Either people won’t be spending their Bitcoin anyway because they’re making so much money just by holding it, or the merchants will get tired of changing their prices every few seconds, assuming they don’t hit technical issues first, like the indivisibility of coins or their software not being able to handle all the zeros after decimal points.
At this point or shortly before, people will start taking their profits. They’ll start spending or selling their hoarded coins. If this manages to start any inflationary momentum at all, you’ll see the deflation scenario played out in reverse. And who’s going to stop it? The supply of Bitcoin is fixed and there is no other use for it besides as a currency. I doubt prices will have much of a chance to rise, since this will happen so fast. Merchants will go from taking one coin for a year of porn to not taking Bitcoin at all, and a bunch of people will be left with worthless Bitcoin.
The reason this can’t happen with government currencies is that government currencies *are* backed. They’re backed by bullets. If demand for USD starts to fall faster than the USG would like, the USG can just raise taxes without increasing spending, increasing demand and reducing supply simultaneously. There’s a bunch of stuff the FED can do, of course, and the FED tends to act first, but its operations are harder to explain. This is obviously not a perfect mechanism, since bubbles are still blown and popped, but even this mechanism is not available with Bitcoin.
Negative feedback loops like this are basically homeostasis. In nature, positive feedback loops like exist with Bitcoin are lethal; the only thing that’s even kept Bitcoin alive this long is its novelty. Either it will remain a novelty forever or it will transition from novelty status to dead faster than you can blink.
This is an interesting and honest critique. I especially like the part about how governments can protect their currencies with bullets. That is so true.
It is true that merchants must update their prices to reflect the current market price of Bitcoin. But there are mechanisms to make this less tedious. For instance, if you use the MyBitcoin.com shopping cart integration, you can peg your product against USD so your BTC price stays in sync. This isn't a perfect solution because getting an accurate peg relies upon the fledgling market data that comes from the Bitcoin exchanges.
Another barrier against the falling price against the BTC value is the use of inventory. This is something somewhat unheard of in USD denominated economies. If you prepare your inventory blocks for multiple sets of price, when you run out of inventory at one price, then inventory in another price becomes available. Welcome to the deflationary economy. It's fun!
Another problem cited by the author above is the problem of having to handle all the zeros after the decimal point. But many government currencies have this same problem in reverse. I.e., they have to handle all the zeros *in front* of the decimal point.
So the author is very worried about Bitcoin deflation. But I am looking forward to it very much. If demand for Bitcoin is that high, it should be very interesting indeed. I, for one, think the coin division isn't prepared *enough*. I think we should be expecting 10^-32, just to be on the safe side. If you have even 50 BTC, right now, hold it. When scarcity *really* sets in, that will be a tidy sum (e.g. if you think 20¢ one-month rise against USD is a lot, you ain't seen nothing yet).
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Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) is an American space-transportation startup company founded by PayPal co-founder Elon Musk. It is developing partially reusable launch vehicles - the Falcon 1 and Falcon 9 - and the Dragon series of space capsules.
If you were doing business with an organization that made the same mistake fifty times and, try as they might, they were never able to correct the problem, would you continue doing business with them?
Say you want a nice New York style cheesecake for your dear old mother's birthday each year. Every year, you go to the same bakery, and every year, for fifty years, they fail to print her name on the cake correctly. And her name is Gurtrude, so maybe you understand it's not the easiest name to get right. But would you really go back to the same bakery year after year, times fifty?
If this was the only bakery in town, maybe you'd eventually go to the next town, just to see if someone, anyone, can get her name right, just once.Or maybe you'd attempt to write the happy birthday message yourself. How hard can it be? At this point, you might reason that if a bakery can't handle this, what makes anyone think they can produce a tasty cheesecake in the first place? You might just make your own.In other words, you have options. That fact alone keeps stuff like this from happening fifty times in real life. After about the third time, the bakery will realize they need to handle the problem because they're losing business because of their own ineptitude.
So this other story didn't take place over the course of fifty years like my illustration. But a mistake was made fifty times (and cheesecake was involved, although it wasn't part of the ongoing problem).
This should help illustrate two things.
First, monopoly is a bad idea. If an organization is able to remove choice and alternatives, how can effective pressure be applied to that organization if it has systemic flaws? The only way to initiate change in such an organization is from the inside. But the removal of choice and alternatives means internal change has less, if any, motive.
Second, if they can't fix this problem, an honest mistake, what assurance does anyone have to expect other more serious problems to be addressed, especially when they can so easily be hidden by the thin blue line?
NYC cops sorry for pounding couple's door 50 times
NEW YORK (AP) - Cheesecake in hand, the police commissioner personally apologized Friday for the 50 or so mistaken, door-pounding visits that police have made to the home of a bewildered elderly Brooklyn couple in the past eight years.
It seems a glitch in computer records had led them over and over to Walter and Rose Martin's modest home in the Marine Park neighborhood, about 7 miles southeast of the Brooklyn Bridge.
The most recent intrusion came Tuesday, with officers pounding on both the front and back doors, yelling "Police, open up!"
On Thursday, detectives from the NYPD's Identity Theft Squad went to see the Martins again - this time to apologize. "And we wanted to be sure perps weren't using that address for identity theft," NYPD Deputy Commissioner Paul Browne told The Associated Press on Friday.
The detectives told 82-year-old Rose and 83-year-old Walter that Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly had ordered them to solve the problem, which started eight years ago and was first reported this week in the New York Daily News.
To bring home the sincerity of the NYPD's contrition, Kelly showed up Friday at the Martin's house with a gift: New York cheesecake.
The commissioner rolled into the quiet Brooklyn neighborhood at midday, stopping in front of the Martins' small, neatly kept house, a large American flag fluttering by the front door.
Kelly "went to apologize - and to explain," Browne said. "They expressed appreciation that the police commissioner came and they showed him pictures of their grandchildren."
The snafu started in 2002, when police used the Brooklyn address as part of what Browne called "random material" to test an automated computer system that tracks crime complaints and records of other internal police information. Before that, the work was done manually.
The couple first complained about the harrowing police visits in 2007, when Rose Martin wrote a letter to Kelly. "And we identified the problem then," Browne said. "It was a mistake by the police department."
Police wiped the Martins' address from the system.
Or so they thought, Browne said. Instead, the visits continued, and some computer files bearing the Martins' address stayed in the system.
"We thought all the test data had been purged, but apparently it had not," Browne said. "The Martins' address ended up migrating to various complaint forms and warrant information."
Most of the visits came in 2006 and 2007, he said. After the latest, "We realized we still had a problem and went back and further purged the records," the deputy commissioner conceded.
To make sure it will never happen again, Browne said the address has been flagged with alerts, so if there's any record indicating officers should question the Martins, "they're barred from doing it."
Rose Martin has asked the department to write her an official letter to that effect.
"It seems like too simple a correction for something that has been going on for eight years," she told the New York Daily News, which first reported the story.
"I'm not feeling well today," she told the AP after the commissioner's visit, adding that neither she nor her husband could comment.
But they did their best to carry on their business. Walter Martin left the house briefly to walk the dog, with a young man helping him.
Source: AP
I have attached a podcast short (25 minute) episode from "School Sucks Podcast: The END of Public Education" that explains how government provides services versus how regular people provide services. The only difference is that this podcast episode uses education to illustrate the business plan. But it's the same for any government service, including police and public education.